Steganography over real-time streaming media is a novel and promising research subject. This paper performs steganography over a typical streaming media, Voice over IP (VoIP) 
Introduction
Steganography, which is an art and science of information hiding, has attracted significant attention due to its wide and successful application in covert communications [1] . So far, much progress has been made in steganography on static storage media including image [2] , video [3] , audio [4] and text [5] , but by contrast, the area of steganography over streaming media is largely unexplored. Streaming media, however, is a promising steganographic cover, which possesses two advantages over storage media. First, the real-time nature of streaming media provides potentially better security for secret messages by virtue of its instantaneity, because it does not give eavesdroppers sufficient amount of time to detect possible abnormity due to hidden messages. In fact, the recognition of specific streaming media in enormous network traffic is a very perplexing and challenging problem, let alone detecting possible covert messages. Second, streaming media can often be considered as a multidimensional carrier in that both the packet protocol headers and the payload data can be used to hide data. Given the potential advantages, steganography over real-time streaming media may become a worthy subject of more thorough studies. In this paper, we will perform steganography over a typical streaming media, Voice over IP (VoIP), to construct secure covert communications.
VoIP is a popular technique to enable telephone calls via a broadband Internet connection. Owing to its advantages of low cost and flexible advanced digital features, VoIP has become an alternative to the public-switched telephone network (PSTN), and extensive research on it has been conducted [6] . In recent years, some researchers have noticed the advantages of VoIP as a nice steganographic cover, and carried out useful research on VoIP-based steganography. Mazurczyk et al. [7] [8] proposed a steganography named LACK for VoIP using lost audio packets. In this approach, the payload of some intentionally delayed packets is used to transmit secret messages to the receiver, which is invisible to the unaware eavesdroppers. Huang et al. [9] made a good and successful effort on a new steganographic algorithm for embedding data in the inactive frames of VoIP streams encoded by ITU-T G.723.1 codec. In addition, most of the other approaches are mainly based on steganographic techniques that can strike a balance between security and complexity for specific speech codec. Due to its relatively high capacity and acceptable security, least-significant-bits (LSBs) steganography, replacing the LSBs with binary bits of secret messages, is popularly employed. Wang et al. [10] proposed a scheme for transmitting secret speeches based on information hiding in VoIP systems. Their hiding process consists of two steps: compressing the secret speeches and then filling their binary bits directly into the LSBs of cover speech coded with G.711. Dittmann et al. [11] and Huang et al. [12] presented more general schemes of steganography over VoIP, which can be used to transmit arbitrary secret messages. However, both of these implemented steganographic techniques only directly replace the LSBs of the cover speech with the binary bits of secret messages, which is vulnerable to detection by the steganalysis algorithm subsequently proposed by Dittmann et al. based on the fact that the distribution of the LSBs in the stego-speech is not uniform [11] . Therefore, Dittmann et al. [11] and Krätzer et al. [13] suggested that messages be encrypted prior to embedding to improve security. However, traditional encryptions, due to their time-consuming characteristic, are not well suited for the real-time steganography over VoIP. In fact, for the real-time covert communication, we must strike an acceptable balance between providing adequate security and maintaining low latency for real-time services. To satisfy the requirement of real-time operation, we [14] proposed an approach that uses a simple encryption to provide short-term but sufficient protection for secret messages. The encryption is based on an exclusive OR (XOR) operation between secret messages and a very large pseudo random number (PRN) generated by an improved Mersenne Twiste (MT) algorithm [15] . If the size of the secret message is no more than 1 MB, the total delay induced by the approach is still acceptable considering the allowable maximum of 150 ms one-way latency recommended by ITU-T G.114 [16] . However, the encryption operation is still totally carried out before the embedding process, so its scalability is not very well. Thus, we [17] further suggested an m-sequence based covert communication model for VoIP. In the model, the m-sequence is employed to encrypted secret messages prior to the LSBs substitution to resist detection by the statistical steganalysis algorithm and provide a short-term security protection. Differing from the previous work in Ref. [13] and [14] , the encryption operation is integrated into the steganographic process instead of carried out beforehand, and thereby only induces a fixed and negligible delay for each frame. Furthermore, this model introduces a suitable synchronization mechanism based on protocol steganography techniques and consequently provides a secure solution for real-time transmitting secret files.
In this paper, we present another covert communication scheme over VoIP for real-time exchanging of secret short messages that are popular in interactive scenarios. In this scheme, a sophisticated compounded pseudorandom sequence (CPS) is used to encrypt secret messages in a real-time manner. The CPS is generated by a compounded pseudorandom number generator that combines linear congruential generator (LCG) and MT generator (MTG), so it outperforms the pseudorandom sequences independently generated by the above two generators at security, randomicity and period. Furthermore, a custom-built synchronization mechanism for covert transmission of interactive secret short messages is designed. This scheme is implemented and evaluated with ITU-T G.729a as the codec of the cover speech in StegVoIP, which is a prototypical covert communication system based on VoIP. The experimental results show that the proposed techniques can provide good security and transparency for covert communication of interactive short secret messages while adequately satisfying the real-time requirement of VoIP.
Proposed covert communication scheme
The core of VoIP-based steganography is the embedding algorithm (how to safely embed the secret messages into VoIP streams) and the restituting algorithm (how to exactly restitute the secret messages from VoIP streams). Moreover, to construct a covert communication, we also need to solve another important problem, i.e. synchronization. In other words, both the communicating parties should come to an agreement about when and where the secret messages will be embedded into the VoIP streams. This section suggests a new VoIP-based covert communication scheme for interactive secret short messages, which is described in three parts. We first present a compounded pseudorandom sequence generator, then detail the LSBs steganographic algorithm including the embedding algorithm and the restituting algorithm, and finally describe the synchronizing strategy.
Generation of compounded pseudorandom sequence
The previous work [11, 13] has proven that it is necessary and important to encrypt secret messages prior to embedding operation to improve security. In order to provide real-time and secure encryption, we propose a compounded pseudorandom number generator (PRNG), combining linear congruential generator (LCG) and MT generator (MTG). LCG is one of the most widely used PRNG [18] , which can be defined by the following recurrence relation,
where s is the seed (start value), m is the modulus, a is a primitive root of m and called multiplier, b is a nonnegative integer and called increment. According to the definition of primitive roots, we can obtain a following congruence equation,
where φ(m) is the Euler function, defined to be the number of positive integers less than or equal to m that are co-prime to m. The Euler function can be stated as follows.
where p 1 , p 2 , ⋯, p n are the prime factors of m. m contains primitive roots if and only if m = 1, 2, 4, p n , 2p n , where p is an odd prime number and n is a negative integer. Apparently, the period of a general LCG is at most m, and for some choices of a much less than that. Generally, LCG will have a full period for all seeds if and only if (1) b and m are relatively prime; (2) a -1 is divisible by all prime factors of m; (3) a -1 is a multiple of 4, if m is a multiple of 4. Therefore, the pseudorandom numbers produced by LCG are sensitive to the choice of the parameters b, a, and m. Due to its predictability, LCG pseudorandom sequence is often not used independently in encryption algorithms.
MTG is one of the best PRNGs, which can provide an astronomical period of 2 19937 -1 and 623-dimensional equidistribution with up to 32 bit accuracy while consuming a working area of only 624 words [15] . Its performance exceeds most of the integer-large-modulus generators. Based on the above two PRNGs, we design a sophisticated compounded PRNG (CPRNG) as shown in Figure 1 , which can produce arbitrary n-bit ((0 < n ≤ 32)) pseudorandom numbers. The generation process can be stated as follows: (1) 
where ℋ(x, y) means taking the higher y bits of x. CPRNG inherits the advantages of LCG and MTG, and can even provide better randomicity and security. Further, the period of CPRNG (denoted by P) is the least common multiple of P LCG (period of LCG) and P MTG (period of MTG). Since P MTG = 2 19937 -1, P = LCM (P LCG , P MTG ) ≥ 2 19937 -1. Specially, if P LCG and P MTG are co-prime, namely the greatest common divisor of P LCG and P MTG is 1, then P = P LCG × P MTG , which is the longest period of CPRNG. 
Steganographic algorithm
Correspondingly, we also divide M into some parts with the fixed size of n bits, namely M = { 0 ,  1 ,
Moreover, we obtain an n-bit pseudorandom number sequence K = { 0 ,  1 , …,  q−1 }. To encrypt all secret messages, the length of K should be not less than the number of secret message parts, i.e. q. Here, we assume that the length of K is equal to q for the convenience of the description. In accordance with the above definitions, the embedding algorithm can be formalized as follows:
where B * = { 
The receiver knows exactly where the secret messages were embedded into VoIP streams, and can regenerate the n-bit pseudorandom number sequence K employed by the sender. Thus, the restituting algorithm consists of two steps: extracting the cipher M * = { 
Synchronization
The synchronization problem concerns two aspects, namely, key negotiation and synchronization of covert communication. In this scheme, the purpose of the key negotiation is to achieve an agreement on the seed of CPRNG between both communicating parties. The traditional solution is to carry out the negotiation offline through another secure channel [12, 13] . To take into account the flexibility and scalability, however, the covert communication system should support the online key negotiation. That is to say, the sender should be able to safely send the adopted key (seed) to the receiver prior to the exchange of secret messages using the covert communication system. For the sake of privacy, the key should be encrypted with a public key cryptography. In our work, we choose the RSA algorithm that is widely used in the key negotiation and the identification. Further, we design a message data structure for transmitting the key, as shown in Figure 2 . This message is called header, since it is sent prior to the main body (i.e. secret messages). In the header, E(key) denotes the cipher of the key encrypted with the public key of the receiver. The parameter LoH indicates the total length of the header. It is often set as a fixed size, in the interest of exact parsing. For example, if the size of LoH field is 16 bits, then the length range of the E(key) field is 1 ~ 2 16 −1 bytes. BoH is a synchronization pattern (a specific bit sequence), indicating the beginning of the header. In order to minimize the operations on voice samples, we do not embed the synchronization pattern into the LSBs of voice samples, and instead employ the protocol steganography techniques that utilize the fact that few headers (e.g. IP header) in packets are changed during transmission [17] . The synchronization pattern is often of short length (e.g. 8 bits) and altered continually, so such a type of transmission is potentially hard to discover. The second problem is the synchronization of covert communication, i.e., how the receiver knows exactly when and where to extract secret messages from the VoIP streams. For this problem, we design a message data structure, as shown in Figure 3 . In this structure, SM denotes the embedded secret message. Moreover, we introduce a synchronization pattern SYN to mark the beginning and the end of SM. Note that SYN cannot appear in SM, otherwise it will result in that the receiver mistakenly stops receiving. Thus, we introduce the frame sync sequence "01111110" in High-Level Data Link Control (HDLC) [19] as SYN, and zero-bit insertion to ensure that it never appears in SM. Zero-bit insertion is a particular type of bit stuffing employed in some data transmission protocols, meaning that a 0 bit is stuffed after the occurrence of every "11111" in the data. Correspondingly, the receiver, when detects these "11111" in the data, removes a "0" added by the sender. In the embedding process, SYNs are also encrypted and embedded into VoIP streams for the sake of security. The receiver can start restituting the secret message after receiving a SYN, and end the restituting operation after receiving another SYN. However, even if the sender does not transmit any secret messages, the receiver may also find SYNs in VoIP streams and consequently mistakes them for synchronization patterns of covert communication. For the problem, we introduce a synchronization pattern BOM to mark the beginning of the secret message. Before transmitting secret messages, the sender should first embed BOM into the first packet using protocol steganography. At the receiver side, upon detecting BOM, the receiver can start restituting secret messages. Note that the sender must ensure that BOM never appears in the headers of the data packets while he (she) does not want to transmit any secret messages. Therefore, when the sender detects an undesired BOM, he (she) should modify an arbitrary bit to avoid possible mistakes.
Evaluation and test
We evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of our scheme in StegVoIP [14, 17] , which is a prototypical covert communication system based on VoIP. StegVoIP supports typical coders, such as ITU-T G.711, G.723.1, G.729a, etc. In the tests, we typically choose G. 729a [20] as the codec of the cover speech, while the scheme can also be applied with other coders used typically in VoIP. Similarly, we choose 8 LSBs (the bits with the least replaced impact on the speech quality) based on the observation that the parameters of fixed codebook in G.729a have the best transparency for information hiding [14, 17] . Correspondingly, we adopt 8-bit pseudorandom number sequence generated by CPRNG with a random seed. Moreover, the LCG parameters in CPRNG are set as follows: a = 1366, b = 150889, m = 714025. In the tests, we mainly focus on two key issues, i.e., impacts of steganography on speech quality and the additional delay due to the proposed algorithms.
Speech quality
In order to evaluate the impact of steganography upon speech quality, we contrast the spectrograms of the cover speeches without steganography and with steganography. We choose the sentence "My favorite character was Donald Duck" (denoted by S) as the cover speeches, and the introduction of National Huaqiao University [21] as the secret message. After encoding by G.729a, S has 238 frames and can consequently conceal 1904 bits of messages. Figure 4 shows the spectrograms of the original speech and its steganographic version. From them, we can find that the steganographic spectrogram shows very slight differences from the original spectrogram, which suggests that the speech quality degradation is nearly negligible.
Figure 4. Spectrograms contrast
To further evaluate the impact of steganography upon speech quality, we employ speech samples provided in ITU-T P.501 Annex B [22] , which are popularly used in conjunction with speech quality evaluation procedures. These samples consist of 10 categories, i.e. Chinese speech, English (UK) speech, English (US) speech, Finnish speech, French speech, German speech, Italian speech, Japanese speech, Polish speech and Spanish speech. Each category includes female speech and male speech. For each sample, the corresponding steganographic experiments are performed on its G.729a encoded file respectively. The secret message (choosing from the introduction of National Huaqiao University, possibly only some forward parts) can be successfully embedded and retrieved in any case. Further, we employ the Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality (PESQ) method [23] to evaluate the quality of cover speeches and their steganographic versions. PESQ compares an original signal with a degraded signal and outputs a PESQ score as a prediction of the perceived quality. The range of the PESQ score is -0.5 to 4.5. Moreover, the PESQ score can be converted to Mean Opinion Score -Listening Quality Objective (MOS-LQO). The range of MOS-LQO is 1.017 (worst) to 4.549 (best), which more closely matches the range of subjective Mean Opinion Score (MOS) [24] . In our PESQ experiments, the reference signals are PCM encoded files converted from original G.729a encoded files; the degraded signals are PCM files converted from steganographic G.729a files. All the PCM files are formatted with 8000 HZ sampling rate, 16 bits quantization and mono. Table 1 shows the average MOS-LQOs of each category, which are approximately 3.0. That is to say, the quality of steganographic speeches is fair for the understanding. Thus, we are confident that our techniques can provide nice steganographic transparency for covert communication.
Additional delay
Another important issue to evaluate is the performance impact of our algorithms on the real-time services of VoIP. To meet the real-time requirement of VoIP, the additional delay due to the proposed algorithms must not noticeably impact the normal workings of VoIP. In the scheme, the additional delay is mostly induced by the embedding algorithm and the restituting algorithm. Thus, we test the embedding time (AET) and the restituting time (ART) per frame on Pentium(R) Dual-core CPU T2060 (1.6 GHZ) computers with 512M DDR2 (533 MHZ) SD RAM. Figure 5 shows the test result of AET and ART for some VoIP frames. We can observe that the maximum AET and ART are not more than 2.3 us, which is negligible compared with the allowable coding time of 15ms for each frame. Therefore, we can safely conclude that our techniques very adequately meet the real-time requirement of VoIP. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a covert communication scheme for interactive secret short messages. In the scheme, to provide real-time and secure encryption, a compounded PRNG combining LCG and MTG is proposed. Moreover, a synchronization mechanism, including key negotiation and message data structures, is designed, which can effectively enhance the flexibility of the covert communication system. The effectiveness of the scheme is evaluated with ITU-T G.729a as the codec of the cover speech in StegVoIP. The experimental results show that our techniques provide good security and transparency for covert communication while adequately meeting the real-time requirement of VoIP. Although this scheme can be also used to transmit secret files, its efficiency will be inevitably reduced, owing to continuous check and modification for undesired SYNs in secret files. Thus, the proposed scheme is not universal, but is a good alternative for interactive secret short messages.
